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  21 Introduction
Contractual arrangements between di⁄erent stakeholders of a ￿rm are crucial for the e¢ -
ciency of its production process and for its pro￿tability. Contract theory has widely studied
these arrangements within a ￿rm in the presence of informational asymmetries (La⁄ont and
Martimort, 2002), contractual incompleteness (Hart, 1995) or other ine¢ ciencies in principal-
agent relations.1 However, contract theory has less often investigated the relation between
contracts within a ￿rm and competition with other ￿rms: some important works have fo-
cused on simple delegation games in duopolies (starting with Fershtman and Judd, 1987, and
Bonanno and Vickers, 1988), but limited attention has been paid to principal-agent contracts
for ￿rms competing in markets whose structure is endogenous, that is where entry of ￿rms
is endogenous. This paper analyzes this issue focusing on the following basic question: how
competitive pressure a⁄ects the optimal contracts and how these contracts a⁄ect the result-
ing market structure?2 I answer this question through a rather general model in which a ￿rm
adopts optimal contractual arrangements with some stakeholders (its manager, its retailers,
its customers,..) before competing with other ￿rms.
The characterization of the optimal contracts can be relevant also for empirical and policy
analysis. On the empirical front, I emphasize the crucial impact of endogenous entry threats
on the nature of the optimal contracts: for instance, one should expect the emergence of sale
incentives, high-powered incentive mechanisms and strong bonuses inducing extra e⁄ort for
the managers of ￿rms which face strong entry threats, and not (or less) for ￿rms without
such threats. In line with these ￿ndings, recent works have emphasized a weak but positive
relation between di⁄erent measures of competition and incentives to promote e⁄ort (Cuæat
and Guadalupe, 2005; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2010), but further
research could fruitfully focus on the precise impact of entry pressure on the contractual
arrangements.
On the policy front, I analyze the general welfare implications of strategic contracts and,
in particular, the antitrust implications of vertical contracts and tying contracts adopted by
a ￿rm facing competition respectively in the downstream market and in the market for the
1See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a wide survey.
2A second question one may ask is what should be the equilibrium structure of the market and of the
contracts when all ￿rms adopt contractual arrangements and market strategies in equilibrium. For an in-
vestigation of this issue in the presence of principal-agent contracts with asymmetric information I refer to
Martin (1993), Martimort (1996) and Etro and Cella (2010).
1tied good. Also here, the presence of endogenous entry threats is crucial, because it leads to
the adoption of contractual arrangements that are aimed at strengthening price competition
without predatory purposes. Contrary to what happens in models with an exogenous number
of ￿rms (￿rst analyzed by Bonanno and Vickers, 1988, and Whinston, 1990), franchising
contracts and tying cannot lead to monopolization of new markets and they actually tend
to reduce prices and improve welfare. As I will show, this generates conclusions that are
in radical contrast with the post-Chicago approach to vertical restraints and exclusionary
contracts, and that can change our perspective on relevant antitrust cases.
To introduce our theoretical framework and establish the link with the traditional litera-
ture on strategic contracts, let us consider basic price competition betwen two ￿rms. It is well
known that in a price duopoly a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm can increase pro￿tability through a
particular form of strategic delegation: this requires a commitment to adopt accommodat-
ing strategies which relax competition and increase prices and pro￿ts of both ￿rms. The
important works by Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) have emphasized the
gains from delegating decisions on prices to managers with negative sale incentives. Raith
(2003) has suggested that, in the presence of moral hazard of the managers, there are gains
from incentive schemes (￿ la Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) with a low variable (output-
related) compensation that generates low e⁄ort and softens competition. The same occurs
in the presence of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers faced with
optimal screening contracts. Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995) have
emphasized the gains from separation in two vertically related ￿rms, where the upstream ￿rm
charges the downstream ￿rm with a francise fee and a wholesale price above marginal cost
once again to soften price competition. In the same spirit, Whinston (1990) has shown that,
when a monopolist in a primary market is also active in a secondary duopolistic market, tying
strengthens competition and can be pro￿table only to deter entry and monopolize the sec-
ondary market. These results are a consequence of strategic complementarity between price
choices (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984; Bulow et al., 1985; Gal-or, 1985): a strategic contract
that induces the manager of a ￿rm to increase its price, induces also the rival ￿rm to increase
its price and therefore it generates higher pro￿ts for the former and, even more, for the latter.
Unfortunately, all these results are not robust to changes in the form of competition, and
they break down when the two ￿rms compete in quantities rather than in prices: this leaves
the literature on strategic contracts with ambiguous results.
As suggested in Etro (2006), a limit of the literature on strategic commitments is that the
2number of competitors (two in most applications) is pre-determined and independent from
the market outcome: this is in stark contrast with most real markets, where entry is attracted
by the pro￿table opportunities left over by the active ￿rms and by expectations on future
pro￿tability. Even in concentrated markets where entry cannot be regarded as free (i.e. easy
and immediate) because of the presence of large sunk costs, the number of active ￿rms can
be often seen in the medium-long run as endogenously determined by the pro￿t conditions
taking into account the exogenous (or endogenous) entry costs (Sutton, 1991). This paper
shows that when a ￿rm is active in such a market, that is where the number of competitors
(two as above, or more) is endogenous, the cited contractual commitments can still play a
role, but in a radically di⁄erent way. Our results for markets with price competition and
endogenous entry can be summarized as follows:
- operative strategies should be always delegated to managers whose objective function is a
weighted average of pro￿ts and sales, and we characterize the optimal (linear) sale incentives;
- in the presence of moral hazard, managerial compensation should provide high-powered
incentives with a larger variable compensation than the other ￿rms, and we derive the optimal
strategic incentive payments in a model ￿ la Holmstrom-Milgrom;
- in the presence of asymmetric information, managerial payment schedules should induce
higher e⁄ort than the other ￿rms, and we derive the optimal screening contracts;
- vertical separation between an upstream producer and a downstream retailer should al-
ways entail wholesale prices below marginal costs for the downstream ￿rm, and we determine
the optimal franchising contracts (and verify the consequences of hold up problems on the
same optimality of vertical separation);
- tying contracts can be e⁄ective devices to gain pro￿ts in a secondary market without
fully deterring entry, and we determine the conditions for the optimality of tying.
The underlying reason of these results is that the strategic purpose of any contract changes
when entry in the market is endogenous. Contractual arrangements that lead to a price
increase are ine⁄ective because they attract entry and reduce sales and pro￿ts. To the
contrary, any contractual commitment to implement a price reducing strategy is e⁄ective
because it limits the pro￿tability of entry and increases the market share and the pro￿ts of
the ￿rm. This motivates positive sale incentives and managerial compensations that promote
cost reducing activities. At the same time, the nature of the optimal franchising contracts
radically changes when entry of downstream ￿rms is free: low prices can only be forced
through wholesale prices below the marginal cost (which are welfare enhancing). Finally,
3tying becomes a useful strategy because it strengthens competition, increases sales in the
secondary market and can increase pro￿ts of the bundling ￿rm even without inducing full
entry deterrence (but increasing welfare).
The nature of these optimal strategic contracts matches what one would obtain if the
same ￿rm was engaged in quantity competition (with strategic substitutability) rather than
price competition, dissolving the traditional ambiguity associated with the optimal strate-
gic contracts:3 when the market structure is endogenous, under both price and quantity
competition it is optimal to commit to an aggressive strategy with appropriate contracts.4
In this paper, I characterize the role of simple strategic contracts in a number of clas-
sic contexts, derive the optimal unilateral contracts (under our functional assumptions) and
characterize the associated equilibrium market structure. The applications concern the cited
models of contracts with managers or customers, but elsewhere I have analyzed contracts
with other stockholders, as the debt contracts (Etro, 2010). In most of the analysis, my fo-
cus is on unilateral contracts to emphasize the nature of the incentives that each single ￿rm
has, and how this changes in markets with exogenous and endogenous structures. Moreover,
the analysis of unilateral commitments is the relevant one when we want to study the conse-
quence of the behavior of a single dominant ￿rm, which has crucial implications for antitrust
policy. Nevertheless, the analysis of equilibria in which more or all ￿rms can adopt the same
contractual commitments can be developed along traditional lines: in a Nash equilibrium
the nature of the equilibrium contracts would be the same as that of the optimal unilateral
contracts characterized here - for instance, see Etro (2010) for the Nash equilibrium debt
contracts adopted by multiple ￿rms in a market with endogenous entry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework of Bre-
trand competition for all the subsequent applications. Section 3 presents the simplest one,
concerning pro￿t-maximizing delegation to managers that do not maximize pro￿ts. Section
4 develops the topic of managerial compensation through a basic principal-agent model of
moral hazard. Section 5 extend the analysis to the case of adverse selection and screening
3A related message emerges in the model of Miller and Pazgal (2001), which shows that, when the set
of incentive parameters available to the ￿rms￿owners is rich enough, the equilibrium prices, quantities and
pro￿ts are the same regardless of whether the ￿rms compete in prices or in quantities.
4Etro (2006) focuses on under- or over-investment in cost-reducing and demand enhancing activities. For
some of the recent applications of the endogenous market structures approach to strategic commitments see
Tesoriere (2008), Creane and Konishi (2009), Erkal and Piccinin (2010), KovÆ￿ c et al. (2010) and Anderson
et al. (2010).
4contracts. Section 6 applies our idea to franchising contracts between vertically separated
￿rms. Section 7 analyzes tying contracts as a strategic device for a monopolist producing
also for a secondary market. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix generalizes the model with
a microfoundation of demand, extends it to Cournot competition and derives welfare results.
2 Bertrand competition with endogenous entry
Consider a market with price competition where entry is endogenous and occurs until pro￿ts
are zero. Is there any contractual commitment that a ￿rm can exploit to gain a competitive
advantage and preserve positive pro￿ts? Contrary to what one may expect in a market
where entry dissipates any pro￿table opportunities for the entrants, the answer is yes. More
important, the kinds of contractual arrangements leading to these gains can be radically
di⁄erent from those emerging in traditional models with an exogenous number of competitors.
Let us consider competition in prices between n ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods.5
Direct demand of ￿rm i can be expressed as Di = D(pi;P￿i) where pi is its price and the
price aggregator P￿i =
Pn
j=1;j6=i g(pj) depends on all the other prices, with D1 < 0, D2 < 0
for some positive function g(p) with g0(p) < 0. Substitutability between goods is guaranteed
by the fact that the cross derivative @Di=@pj ￿ ￿ij is always positive: ￿ij = D2g0(pj) > 0
for any i and j. As an example, isoelastic preferences ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz generate direct
demands nested in the above function, but one can also microfound in a similar way the
Logit demand or other demand functions.
Each ￿rm bears a ￿xed cost of entry F > 0 and produces at a constant marginal cost c.
Without any strategic contracts, net pro￿ts for ￿rm i are:
￿i = (pi ￿ c)D(pi;P￿i) ￿ F (1)
Strategic complementarity holds, i.e. @2￿i=@pi@pj > 0, which requires ￿ij > DD12g0(pj)=D1.
All active ￿rms choose their prices simultaneously. The equilibrium number of active
￿rms n is such that expected pro￿ts for the n-th entrant are zero.6 Therefore, in a symmetric
situation, a ￿rst order condition D(p;P) + (p ￿ c)D1(p;P) = 0 and a free entry condition
5We leave to the Appendix a microfoundation of such a model, which allows us to derive rigorous welfare
comparisons, and a generalization to the case of competition in quantities.
6As usual we neglect the integer constraint on the number of ￿rms, but we restrict the analysis to the set
of parameters for which at least two ￿rms remain active (this is the relevant case for small enough ￿xed costs
and relevant product di⁄erentiation).
5(p ￿ c)D(p;P) = F would determine the equilibrium values of the common price p and of
the number of ￿rms n through the price aggregator P = (n ￿ 1)g(p).
In this framework we will examine the impact of preliminary contractual arrangements
between a ￿rm, say ￿rm L, and its partners (managers, retailers, customers, employers,..).
Accordingly, the timing of our baseline model will be the following:
Stage 1: ￿rm L adopts a contractual arrangement to maximize its expected pro￿ts.
Stage 2: entry of other ￿rms occurs until expected pro￿ts are non-negative.
Stage 3: all ￿rms j = 1;2;:::;L;:::;n choose simultaneously their prices.
One can think of the contractual arrangements as strategic commitments that incumbents
choose to optimize their productive organization in the long run. For simplicity we assume
that a single ￿rm adopts these arrangements, but we could easily extend the model to multiple
incumbents adopting them. What is crucial is that there is always space for entry of a residual
fringe of competitors: this justi￿es why entry of other ￿rms takes place in the subsequent
stage. Finally, pricing decisions can be seen as short run decisions and, therefore, they are
taken at the last stage.
As we will verify (and contrary to what happens with a ￿xed number of ￿rms), strategic
contracts by a ￿rm cannot a⁄ect the equilibrium price (p), the demand (D(p;P)) and the
net pro￿ts (zero) of the other ￿rms in an endogenous market structure. Nevertheless, in
the following sections we will analyze di⁄erent strategic contracts and show how a ￿rm can
use them to obtain a comparative advantage over the other ￿rms and gain strictly positive
pro￿ts.7
We remind the reader that our purpose is to verify how the endogeneity of market struc-
tures a⁄ects a number of traditional results on di⁄erent strategic contracts, therefore each
one of the following sections should be seen as a separate application in itself.
3 Strategic delegation to non-pro￿t maximizers
In this section we consider the simplest example of strategic contract, introduced by Fersht-
man and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). Suppose that the pro￿t-maximizing equity holders
7Notice that endogenous entry overturns the second mover advantage pointed out by Gal-or (1985) for
duopolies with strategic complementarity. While one could extend the analysis to a Nash equilibrium where
all ￿rms adopt similar strategic commitments, the analysis of a unilateral adoption is the simplest way to
capture the nature of the mechanisms that we want to study.
6of ￿rm L delegate the pricing decision to a manager whose objective function depends on
both pro￿ts and sales, for simplicity through a linear contract with explicit sale incentives.
In such a case we can express the objective function of the management as:8
￿(pL;P￿L;k) = ￿L + k ￿ pLD(pL;P￿L) =
= [pL(1 + k) ￿ c]D(pL;P￿L) ￿ F (2)
where the weight on sales k is chosen ex ante by the ￿rm￿ s owner to maximize pure pro￿ts. All
the other ￿rms directly maximize pro￿ts. In this set up, Sklivas (1987) has shown that with
n = 2 it is optimal to choose k < 0, that is negative sale incentives (contrary to what happens
under competition in quantities). To verify this in our framework, notice that the duopoly
equilibrium is characterized by the system of ￿rst order conditions determining the prices
pL(k) for ￿rm L and pj(k) for the rival j.9 These prices are both decreasing in k because
of strategic complementarity. Given this, one can easily derive an implicit expression for the





j(k) ￿ cD1 (pL;g(pj))p0
L(k)
< 0
where we used the equilibrium pricing condition for ￿rm L. Negative sale incentives are used
to soften competition and maintain a low production while increasing prices and pro￿ts. The
result generalizes to a larger exogenous number of ￿rms.
Consider now the case of free entry in the market. For a given k, the endogenous market
structure is characterized by the price pL for ￿rm L, the price p for all the other ￿rms (by
symmetry), and a number n of ￿rms. These equilibrium variables satisfy the respective ￿rst
order conditions and the zero pro￿t condition:
[D(pL;P￿L) + pLD1(pL;P￿L)](1 + k) = cD1(pL;P￿L) (3)
D(p;P) + pD1(p;P) = cD1(p;P) and (p ￿ c)D(p;P) = F (4)
This system is characterized by a price p and a price aggregator P = (n ￿ 2)g(p) + g(pL)
which do not depend on the parameter k - see the two equations in (4), and by a price of the
8Similar results emerge in case of quantity incentives as opposed to sale incentives (Vickers, 1985). The
linear contract has been chosen only for tractability, and to emphasize the need of positive or negative sale
incentives.
9The equilibrium conditions are D(pL;g(pj)) + (pL ￿ c=(1 + k))D1(pL;g(pj)) = 0 and D(pj;g(pL)) +
(pj ￿ c)D1(pj;g(pL)) = 0.
7￿rm L given by pL = pL(k), which is decreasing in k - p0
L(k) < 0 from (3). As a consequence,
we can express the price index perceived by ￿rm L as:
P￿L = (n ￿ 1)g(p) = P + g(p) ￿ g(pL(k))
which depends on k only through the last term. Accordingly, a larger weight on sales in
the compensation of the manager induces a lower price to expand sales, but does not a⁄ect
the equilibrium prices of the other ￿rms (while it reduces the endogenous number of ￿rms).




[pL(k) ￿ c]D[pL(k);P + g(p) ￿ g(pL(k))] ￿ F
where pL(k) satis￿es the equilibrium system above. The optimality condition is:
D(pL;P￿L) + (pL ￿ c)[D1(pL;P￿L) ￿ ￿LL] = 0 (5)
where pL = pL(k￿) and we de￿ned ￿LL = D2(pL(k￿);P￿L)g0(pL(k￿)) > 0. Using the ￿rst





The optimality of positive sale incentives derives from their strategic impact on entry. The
term ￿LL represents the indirect e⁄ect that an induced price change exerts on demand
through the change in the endogenous number of entrants. The larger is the negative impact
on entry of a price reduction of ￿rm L (due to the sale incentives), the larger is the increase in
its demand, which makes it more pro￿table to adopt sale incentives (increases k￿). Summing
up, we have:
Proposition 1. Under competition in prices with endogenous entry, a ￿rm would always
gain from delegating the pricing decisions to a manager whose objective function depends on
both pro￿ts and sales (or from committing to positive sale incentives for the management).
As noticed before, in case of Bertrand competition between n ￿rms where the number n
is exogenously set, it was optimal for pro￿t-maximizing equity holders to delegate the man-
agement to someone with negative sale incentives (Fershtman and Judd, 1987, and Sklivas,
1987). Contrary to this, when the market is endogenously characterized by the same number
of ￿rms, we obtain that it is optimal to delegate the management to someone who has incen-
tives to maximize a weighted average of pro￿ts and sales, for instance through positive sale
8incentives.10 It is immediate to verify that the same result holds also under quantity com-
petition with endogenous entry (because it is optimal to promote production and reduce the
total production of the rivals).11 Therefore strategic delegation with positive sale incentives
is always optimal in case of endogenous market structures.
This result can be related to the general principle of strategic commitments derived by
Etro (2006) for which there is always a strategic incentive to adopt an investment k which
increases the marginal pro￿tability of a higher production, or, equivalently in our framework,
decreases the marginal pro￿tability of a higher price (for the delegated agent). Here, we have
￿13 (pL;P￿L;k) = D(pL;P￿L) + pLD1(pL;P￿L), which is negative in equilibrium, therefore
the general principle applies. However, strategic delegation has obtained something more:
through it, the ￿rm has been able to exactly replicate the best pre-commitment equilibrium.
We de￿ne this best equilibrium as the pro￿t-maximizing equilibrium that can be obtained
by ￿rm L with a direct commitment on the price before entry decisions and price decisions
are taken by the other ￿rms, namely the Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry.12
To verify this, notice that such an equilibrium is characterized by a price of the followers p
and a corresponding price aggregator P which depend on the price of the leader pL according
to the same ￿rst order condition and the endogenous entry condition as in (4). Given this,
the optimal price of the leader pL is the one chosen to maximize (pL ￿c)D(pL;P￿L), where
P￿L = P + g(p) ￿ g(pL), which provides the same ￿rst order condition as in (5). All these
conditions are met by the optimal strategic delegation k￿ derived above. This equivalence
result is due to the absence of any costs in the enforcement of the desired contract: strategic
delegation by ￿rm L delivers the same outcome as if ￿rm L were able to precommit on a
price strategy. This leads one to derive the welfare implications of the delegation mechanism
(see the Appendix for a rigorous and general proof): such a mechanism does not a⁄ect the
equilibrium price aggregator and the price index, and therefore it does not a⁄ect consumer
10Analogously, we could consider the bargaining power of labor unions in setting wages at the ￿rm level.
Since this increases wages and induces the ￿rm to increase prices, a ￿rm would like to grant some bargaining
power to the union when facing exogenous entry in the product market, but not when facing endogenous
entry pressure.
11See the Appendix. This corresponds to what found by Fershtman and Judd (1987) for a duopoly in
quantities. However, in that case a larger production was reducing the production of the rival, while in our
case with endogenous entry it is reducing the number of rivals (with a constant individual production).
12The general characterization of Stackelberg equilibria with a ￿rst mover and endogenous entry of followers
is developed in Etro (2008).
9surplus, but it increases pro￿ts (of ￿rm L), and therefore total welfare.
The predictions of models on strategic delegation could be tested empirically. In par-
ticular, it is more likely to observe sale-based incentives or to observe stronger incentives,
in markets with a heavy entry threat rather than in markets where there is no competitive
pressure from outsiders. Moreover, controlling for the form of competition (or the form of
strategic interaction as in Sundaram et al., 1996), one should ￿nd the distinction between
price and quantity competition irrelevant for the adoption of these mechanisms in the ￿rst
kind of markets (with high entry threats), but crucially relevant only for the second kind of
markets (without entry threats). In a similar fashion, one could test the impact of the entry
pressure on other incentive mechanisms adopted within ￿rms (some of which will be discussed
in the following sections). Czarnitzki et al. (2010) provide a ￿rst empirical investigation on
the incentives to invest in R&D: they ￿nd a strong impact of entry pressure on the incentives
of the market leaders, in line with the strategic motive emphasized here. More empirical
research in this direction is certainly needed.
Until now we assumed that the principal (the equity holder of the ￿rm) could choose a
parameter of a linear objective function of the agent (the manager). A more accurate de-
scription of a principal-agent relation requires the former to choose the optimal contract with
the latter, a problem that becomes more complex in the presence of asymmetric information
between the parties. The next two sections focus on this problem introducing costly e⁄ort
by the manager.
4 Incentive contracts and moral hazard
Delegation through explicit incentive schemes is crucial in the presence of moral hazard of the
managers. As shown by Raith (2003) the nature of these schemes depends on the intensity
of competition: under price competition, lower variable compensations are used when the
number of competitors increases. Moreover, these schemes can also be used to obtain a
competitive advantage in the market, with lower variable compensations adopted to relax
price competition.
Following the classic work of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994), we will adopt a
speci￿cation in which linear contracts are known to be optimal. Consider a manager receiving











where ￿ > 0 is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion and the cost of e⁄ort has been assumed
quadratic with d positive parameter. The compensation includes a constant part, ￿, and a
part depending linearly on the observable performance, expressed in terms of unitary cost
reductions of size q, according to a linear parameter k:
w = ￿ + kq (8)
The manager must be compensated enough to reach the reservation utility corresponding
to an alternative riskless wage ￿ w. The cost reduction is stochastic but positively related to
e⁄ort, with:
q = e + "
where " is a random variable which is normally distributed with zero mean and variance ￿2,
and whose realization is known at the time of production. Therefore, the ￿rm produces at
the constant marginal cost c￿q = c￿e￿" and the manager exerts e⁄ort e to maximize the
certainty equivalent payo⁄:






Now, imagine that a ￿rm i facing this incentive problem with its manager is also competing
with other ￿rms in the product market (the production/pricing decision is non-contractable
and is taken at the competition stage simultaneously with the other ￿rms to maximize prof-
its). E⁄ective pro￿ts are:
￿i = D(pi;P￿i)[pi ￿ (c ￿ ei ￿ "i)] ￿ ￿i ￿ ki(ei + "i) ￿ F
whose equilibrium expectation is:
￿(pi;P￿i;k) = D(pi;P￿i)
￿













where we used the incentive compatibility constraint ei = ki=d and the individual rational-
ity constraint ￿ w = ￿i + k2
i=2d ￿ ￿k2
i￿2=2. Given the incentive contracts, all ￿rms choose
independently their prices to maximize expected pro￿ts, according to the condition:
D(pi;P￿i) +
￿




D1 (pi;P￿i) = 0 (10)
11Let us now evaluate the optimal contract of a single ￿rm, summarized by the parameter k,
when the other competitors do not adopt incentive contracts, i.e. setting ki = 0 (later on,
we will brie￿ y consider the case in which all ￿rms choose their optimal incentive contracts as
well, showing that the spirit of our results is not a⁄ected).
Consider ￿rst the case of a duopoly. The system of ￿rst order conditions provides prices
pL(k) for ￿rm L and pj(k) for the single competitor which are both decreasing in the incentive
contract of ￿rm L. Given this, one can easily derive an implicit expression for the optimal
incentive scheme as:
k =
D(pL;g(pj)) + d(pL ￿ c)￿Ljp0
j(k)
1 + ￿d￿2 ￿ ￿Ljp0
j(k)
where we used the equilibrium pricing condition for ￿rm L. This optimal scheme dif-
fers from the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) contract because of the terms including ￿Lj =
D2(pL;g(pj(k)))g0(pj(k)), which re￿ ect the negative impact of a price reduction of the com-
petitor on demand. The optimal incentive scheme is still decreasing in the cost of e⁄ort
d, in the degree of risk aversion ￿ and in the randomness of the performance ￿2, but it is
now reduced because more high-powered incentive mechanisms strenghten competition and
reduce the prices of both ￿rms and the associated pro￿ts (such a result would emerge also in
the model of Raith, 2003).
Consider now the case of free entry. Firm L can choose its incentive contract k before
entry occurs. This implies that the endogenous market structure will be characterized by
a price pL(k) for ￿rm L which is again decreasing in k, and by a price p for all the other
￿rms and an associated price aggregator P which satisfy optimality and free entry conditions
and do not depend on k. Using the equilibrium expression P￿L = P + g(p) ￿ g(pL(k)), the
optimal incentive scheme for ￿rm L must solve the problem:
max
k
D[pL(k);P + g(p) ￿ g(pL(k))]
￿











whose optimality condition provides the following implicit expression:
k￿ =
D(pL;P￿L) ￿ d(pL ￿ c)￿LLp0
L
1 + ￿d￿2 + ￿LLp0
L
(12)
where we used the equilibrium pricing condition for ￿rm L and ￿LL = D2(pL;P￿L)g0(pL).
Now the di⁄erence compared to the Holmostrom and Milgrom (1991) scheme is due to the
positive impact on demand that derives from a price reduction induced by stronger incentive
mechanisms. It is exactly the indirect impact of a price reduction on demand (due to the
12lower number of rivals) that makes it useful to adopt a larger variable compensation for the
manager to enhance cost e¢ ciency.13
We can summarize our ￿ndings as follows:
Proposition 2. Under competition in prices with endogenous entry and with moral
hazard of the managers in cost-reducing activities, a ￿rm would always gain from committing
to stronger high-powered incentive schemes for its managers than the other ￿rms.
It is important to verify that the same optimal mechanism emerges when all the other
￿rms simultaneously choose their incentive contracts and their market strategies (given the
incentive contract of ￿rm L). In such a case, the symmetric equilibrium incentive mechanism




because strategic considerations are absent for these ￿rms, and the
prices would satisfy the symmetric pricing condition D(p;P) + D1 (p;P)
￿
p ￿ c + ￿ k=d
￿
= 0
and the free entry condition D(p;P)
￿
p ￿ c + ￿ k=d
￿
= F. Given this, ￿rm L would choose its
contract according to the same rule as in (12), which shows that k￿ > ￿ k again.
In case of endogenous market structures a ￿rm has an incentive to reward more a bet-
ter performance so as to reduce expected costs and increase expected sales and pro￿ts.15
Correspondingly, the e⁄ort and the expected wage must be increasing with the optimal k.
In other words, a ￿rm gains from paying its managers more and with more high-powered
schemes under an endogenous competitive pressure: this happens to stimulate their e⁄ort
and develop a comparative cost advantage over the competitors.
These results naturally lead to implications for the empirical reserach on incentive con-
tracts (see Prendergast, 1999). A weak but positive relation between competition and incen-
tives to promote e⁄ort has been emphasized in recent investigations by Cuæat and Guadalupe
(2005) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). Our results suggest that the strength of the com-
petitive entry threat in a market may crucially a⁄ect the nature of the incentive contracts:
13Similar results would emerge with straightforward extensions of the Holmstrom-Milgrom case, as with
multiple tasks by the same manager, multiple agents, or payments conditional on other information correlated
with e⁄ort.
14Here we are implicitly assuming that both contract and pricing decisions are taken simultaneously. If
contract decisions were taken before pricing decisions, there would be an additional incentive to reduce ￿ k due
to the strategic e⁄ects on equilibrium prices (see also Vives, 2008).
15Also this result can be derived from the general principle of strategic commitments because
￿13 (pL;P￿L;k) = D1 (pL;P￿L)=d < 0. Notice that the results would change if the agent￿ s e⁄ort was
a⁄ecting demand rather than costs.
13these should be aimed at inducing more e⁄ort when the entry threat is stronger compared
to the case of markets without entry threats.
It is easy to verify that our results hold also under quantity competition and endogenous
entry (because it is always convenient to promote production and reduce the total production
of the rivals). However, notice that the optimal strategic contract does not replicate the best
pre-commitment equilibrium (here the Stackelberg equilibrium in prices with endogenous
entry), which would require the Holmstrom-Milgrom scheme with a precommitment to a lower
price.16 In the presence of moral hazard, the marginal bene￿t of a tougher management must
be balanced with the marginal cost of inducing extra e⁄ort. Nevertheless, also in this case,
the optimal contract does not a⁄ect the equilibrium price index, therefore it tends to leave
consumer surplus unchanged, but it increases total welfare through the positive impact on
total pro￿ts (see the Appendix for a formal derivation with microfounded demand functions).
As a consequence, the adoption of incentive contracts inducing extra e⁄ort is always welfare
improving.
This example has shown that a principal-agent contract should adopt incentive schemes
not only to encourage e⁄ort and provide risk sharing, but also to encourage the management
to be tougher in the market. In the next section we will see that a similar result emerges in
the presence of adverse selection.
5 Screening contracts and adverse selection
The purpose of this section is to characterize the optimal screening contracts for managers
with private information on their productivity.17
Consider a manager exerting e⁄ort k which reduces the marginal cost of production to
c ￿ f(k) with f0(k) > 0, f00(k) < 0 and f(0) = 0. E⁄ort and compensation w determine the
utility:
u(w;k) = w ￿ ￿k (13)
where ￿ is a productivity parameter that is private information and can take values ￿1 or
16Under price competition, the optimal pre-commitment would require a price pL satisfying D (pL;P￿L)+
￿
pL ￿ c + ￿ k=d
￿
[D1 (pL;P￿L) ￿ ￿LL] = 0.
17For a good introduction to the principal-agent theory with adverse selection see La⁄ont and Martimort
(2002). Only few papers have analyzed the optimal principal-agent contracts for ￿rms engaged in market
competition: see Martin (1993), Martimort (1996) and, more recently, Etro and Cella (2010).
14￿2 > ￿1 with probabilities ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿. For a given contract (w;k), the pro￿ts of ￿rm L are
given by:
￿L = D(pL;P￿L)[pL ￿ (c ￿ f(k))] ￿ w ￿ F
while the pro￿ts of the other ￿rms are given by ￿i = D(pi;P￿i)(pi ￿ c)￿F under the simple
assumption that they do not use incentive contracts (below we brie￿ y discuss how to relax
this assumption).
It is easy to verify that in the case of a duopoly, ￿rm L would have a strategic incentive
to distort downward the e⁄ort of its manager, and would choose its contracts accordingly to
soften price competition. However, here we will characterize the optimal screening contract
o⁄ered by ￿rm L in the presence of endogenous entry in the market.
Once a contract (w;k) is decided and the manager exerts e⁄ort k, the endogenous market
structure is characterized by the usual optimality and free entry conditions:
D(pL;P￿L) + D1 (pL;P￿L)[pL ￿ c + f(k)] = 0
D(p;P) + D1 (p;P)(p ￿ c) = 0, D(p;P)(p ￿ c) = F
where p and P are independent from the e⁄ort of the manager, but pL(k) is decreasing in it.
It follows that P￿L(k) = P + g(p) ￿ g(pL(k)) is decreasing in k.
The optimal screening contract involves two alternatives (w1;k1) and (w2;k2) for man-
agers of types ￿1 and ￿2. The contract must maximize expected pro￿ts under individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints:
wj ￿ ￿jkj, wj ￿ ￿jkj ￿ wq ￿ ￿jkq with j;q = 1;2
Usual arguments deliver that the binding constraints will be the individual rationality con-
straint for the ine¢ cient type, w2 = ￿2k2, and the incentive compatibility constraint for the
e¢ cient type, w1 = ￿1k1 + (￿2 ￿ ￿1)k2. Therefore, we can state the problem as follows:
max
(k1;k2)
￿ [D(pL(k1);P￿L(k1))[pL(k1) ￿ c + f(k1)] ￿ ￿1k1 + (￿2 ￿ ￿1)k2] +
+(1 ￿ ￿)[D(pL(k2);P￿L(k2))[pL(k2) ￿ c + f(k2)] ￿ ￿2k2] (14)
De￿ning D(k) ￿ D[pL(k);P + g(p) ￿ g(pL(k))] and using the envelope theorem, we can
express the ￿rst order conditions as:
f0(k￿
1)D(k￿
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whose di⁄erence relies in the usual downward distortion of the e⁄ort of the ine¢ cient type,
which depends on the productivity di⁄erence (￿2 ￿￿1). More interestingly for our purposes,
both e⁄orts are increased through the last terms on the right hand side, which decrease the
marginal cost of e⁄ort.18 Both types are required to exert more e⁄ort for strategic purposes,
which reduces the price in both states of the world, with a positive impact on the expected
pro￿ts. However, notice that this increases also the informational rent of the e¢ cient type,
which is simply:
u(w1;k1) = (￿2 ￿ ￿1)k2
In the presence of adverse selection, part of the gains in pro￿ts from a more aggressive
competition must be shifted to the managers, and in particular to the e¢ cient types of
managers. Once again, the optimal contract leaves unchanged the equilibrium price index,
therefore it tends to increase total welfare through an increase of the total pro￿ts with an
unchanged consumer surplus (see the Appendix).
Notice that the same results hold in a more general setting. In case of a general distrib-
ution of ￿ on [￿1;￿2] according to a cumulative distributive function G(￿) with density g(￿)
and satisfying the monotone hazard rate property for which G(￿)=g(￿) is increasing in ￿, the
optimal contract requires e⁄ort choices with:







which leads to the same implications as above. Summing up:
Proposition 3. Under competition in prices with endogenous entry and with asymmetric
information on the productivity of the managers in cost-reducing activities, a ￿rm would
always gain from screening contracts inducing extra e⁄ort for all types.
Also in this case, we would obtain the same qualitative result under competition in quan-
tities and endogenous entry, because extra e⁄ort would induce aggressive behavior in all
cases.
What happens when all ￿rms are allowed to choose their screening contracts (that is
when we have genuine competition in contracts)? This interesting issue raises more complex
18To verify that the general principle of strategic commitments applies, notice that ￿13 (pL;P￿L;k) =
D1(pL;P￿L)f0(k) < 0. The optimal e⁄ort is higher for both types when ￿LL is large, that is when there is
a large indirect impact of a price cut on demand (through the reduction of the number of competitors).
16problems, because strategic interactions between ￿rms a⁄ect the nature of the incentive
contracts and vice versa. In a duopoly, the pro￿ts depend on the e⁄orts of both managers,
and therefore the contracts of each ￿rm a⁄ect the absolute and marginal pro￿tability of the
other ￿rm. The downward distortion of the e⁄ort required from the ine¢ cient managers leads
the equilibrium contracts to increase the e⁄ort required from the e¢ cient managers (above
the level obtained without asymmetric information).19 However, when possible, a ￿rm would
still like to commit to contracts that require lower e⁄orts with the purpose of softening
competition. Such a motivation would disappear in case of endogenous entry, because lower
e⁄ort would simply attract new competitors and reduce pro￿tability. Again, these results
could lead to interesting empirical investigations on the impact of entry threats on the nature
of the incentive contracts in di⁄erent markets.
As we have seen, a vertical principal-agent structure can be used to promote aggressive
competition and increase its pro￿ts in a market characterized by free entry. In the next
section we will see that even in the absence of incentive contracts, the same purpose can be
achieved through vertical separation and appropriate franchising contracts.
6 Vertical contracts and hold up
Following Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995), let us reconsider our
model of price competition introducing the possibility for a ￿rm to produce the good, but to
delegate its distribution (for the ￿nal consumers) to a separate ￿rm by means of a vertical
contract of franchising.
Assume that ￿rm L separates vertically: an upstream ￿rm produces the good and dele-
gates its distribution on the market to a downstream ￿rm through a two-part tari⁄ implying
a ￿xed fee ￿ and a wholesale price w for the good. The downstream ￿rm sells this same
good at the price pD to maximize net pro￿ts:
￿D = (pD ￿ w)D(pD;P￿D) ￿ ￿ (17)
while the other ￿rms remain vertically integrated and bear a marginal cost c and a ￿xed
cost F. The upstream ￿rm produces its good with the same technology and chooses the
franchising contract with the downstream ￿rm, that is the pair (w;￿) that maximizes net
19In other words, the ￿no distortion on the top￿property fails for equilibrium strategic reasons. See Etro
and Cella (2010) for an investigation of this form of competition in contracts.
17pro￿ts:
￿L = (w ￿ c)D(pD;P￿D) + ￿ ￿ F (18)
It is always optimal to choose w such that the pro￿ts of the downstream ￿rm are maximized,
and the fee that fully expropriates these pro￿ts. In an in￿ uential work, Bonanno and Vickers
(1988) have shown that when n = 2 it is optimal to choose a high wholesale price w > c
to soften price competition, and increase prices and pro￿ts. When entry in the market is
endogenous, however, the ￿rm cannot operate in this way, because high wholesale prices
would put the downstream ￿rm out of business. Nevertheless, the ￿rm can still gain from
delegating pricing decisions to the downstream retailer, but with an optimal contract which
is now radically di⁄erent.
As in the previous applications, given the pair (w;￿), the endogenous market structure
is characterized by a price of the downstream ￿rm pD(w) which depends on w, and is now
increasing in it, and by a price for the other ￿rms p and an endogenous value for the price
aggregator P that are both independent from w, with P￿D = P + g(p) ￿ g(pD(w)). The
optimal contract solves the problem:
max
(w;￿)
￿L = (w ￿ c)D[pD(w);P￿D] + ￿ ￿ F
s:v: : ￿D = [pD(w) ￿ w]D[pD(w);P￿D] ￿ ￿ ￿ 0
Since the constraint is always binding, we can substitute this and the equilibrium de￿nition
of P￿D to rewrite the problem as:
max
w ￿L = [pD(w) ￿ c]D[pD(w);P + g(p) ￿ g(pD(w))] ￿ F
The solution requires a wholesale price for the retailer smaller than the marginal cost and
implicitly given by:




where we combined the optimality condition with the equilibrium pricing condition for the
downstream ￿rm and we de￿ned ￿DD = D2(pD;P￿D)g0(pD) > 0. This wholesale price
generates a lower equilibrium price and a higher output for the downstream retailer than for
the other ￿rms, and provides positive pro￿ts for the upstream ￿rm.20 Summing up:
20To verify that the general principle of strategic commitments applies, de￿ne k = c ￿ w as the wholesale
discount, and ￿(pD;P￿D;k) = (pD ￿ c + k)D(pD;P￿D) as the gross pro￿t of the delegated ￿rm. Then, we
have ￿13 (pD;P￿D;k) = D1(pL;P￿L) < 0. Once again, notice that the wholesale discount is larger when
￿DD is large, that is when there is a large indirect impact of a price cut on demand (through the reduction
of the number of competitors).
18Proposition 4. Under competition in prices with endogenous entry, a ￿rm would always
gain from separating vertically and adopting a franchising contract toward the downstream
￿rms with a two-part tari⁄ and a wholesale price below the marginal cost.
Contrary to the result of Bonanno and Vickers (1988), as long as entry is endogenous
and two-part tari⁄s are available, it is optimal to delegate distribution to a retailer with a
francise fee contract involving a wholesale price below marginal cost, because this induces the
retailer to price aggressively in the market, conquer a larger market share and retain positive
pro￿ts in spite of free entry. Notice that the same result could be reached with a resale price
maintenance or with a mechanism of quantity forcing.21 It is immediate to verify that the
same qualitative result holds also under quantity competition (once again, it is convenient to
induce higher production of the retailer to reduce total production of the rivals), therefore
strategic vertical separation with wholesale prices below cost is always optimal in case of
endogenous market structures.
6.1 Antitrust implications
The theory of vertical separation under interbrand (price) competition has been used to
motivate anti-competitive behavior through vertical restraints.22 However, our result shows
that there is no ground for conjecturing any anti-competitive behavior in markets open to
entry because two-part tari⁄s are used to reduce the ￿nal prices: in the Appendix we also
show that these vertical contracts do not a⁄ect consumer surplus, but they increase total
pro￿ts and welfare. It is important to remark that such an aggressive strategy could not
emerge under linear pricing (without ￿xed fee), because the upstream ￿rm would be unable
to induce a low ￿nal price and extract pro￿ts at the same time: vertical separation is e⁄ective
only with non-linear pricing when entry is endogenous.
Our result on the optimal two-part tari⁄ can be used also to revisit some of the insights
of the antitrust literature on exclusive dealing.23 Suppose that upstream ￿rms produce a
21The same mechanism of resale price maintenance is analyzed by Sha⁄er (1991) with an exogenous number
of ￿rms and requires the upstream ￿rm to impose the optimal price on the downstream ￿rm while extracting
all its pro￿ts with an appropriate wholesale price. The mechanism of quantity forcing requires an appropriate
two-part tari⁄ to induce the appropriate price and extract the full surplus from the retailer. I am thankful
to Ryoko Oki for pointing this out.
22See Motta (2004) for an extensive treatment of this model with exogenous entry. On applications of the
endogenous market structure approach to antitrust issues see Etro (2007).
23The recent literature on exclusive dealing when buyers are competing distributors is entirely con￿ned
19homogenous good at constant marginal cost c and sell it to a downstream sector. The
downstream sector uses the good as an input to produce di⁄erentiated ￿nal goods and is
characterized by positive ￿xed costs and endogenous entry. Price competition in both markets
leads to marginal cost pricing for the input (w = c) and zero pro￿ts for all the ￿rms. However,
an upstream ￿rm could o⁄er an exclusive dealing contract to a downstream ￿rm, and then
use the same two-part tari⁄ as above to induce aggressive pricing and extract a positive
pro￿t. Actually, any downstream ￿rm would be available to sign such a contract for a
negligible fee, because the alternative would be zero pro￿ts. Most important, this would
be possible even if the upstream ￿rm was relatively ine¢ cient, say with a marginal cost cI
slightly higher than the marginal cost of the other upstream ￿rms, say cE.24 Again, such an
exclusive dealing contract would strengthen price competition without predatory purposes
(and, again, it would not work in case of simple linear input prices).25
6.2 Speci￿c investments and incomplete contracts
In the rest of this section we examine a form of ine¢ ciency that often emerges in the presence
of vertical contracts. Until now (since we did not introduce any transaction costs) the optimal
vertical contract was able to replicate the best reachable equilibrium, that is the Stackelberg
equilibrium in prices with endogenous entry. However, as pointed out in a general framework
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), contractual incompleteness can
undermine the optimality of vertical separation when the two ￿rms undertake relation-speci￿c
and unveri￿able investments.26 In what follows, we examine this possibility in the tradition
of the property rights theory.
Suppose that, in a preliminary stage, the upstream ￿rm can invest e to reduce the marginal
to the case of an exogenous number of distributors - see Fumagalli and Motta (2006) corrected by Wright
(2009), and especially Abito and Wright (2008). I am thankful to a referee for pointing out this application,
and to Ryoko Oki for long discussions on exclusive dealing with endogenous entry.
24As long as w￿(cI) < cE, the exclusive dealing contract induces aggressive pricing and can be pro￿table.
If this is the case, the upstream ￿rm gains from extending the same exclusive dealing contract to other
downstream ￿rms. One could then investigate under which conditions an endogenous number of exclusive
dealing contracts can deter entry of a more e¢ cient upstream producer. We leave this important issue for
future research.
25In general, this suggests that, at least under linear pricing and endogenous entry in the downstream
market, exclusive dealing cannot have a strategic (or predatory) purpose, but can only have an e¢ ciency
rationale. This is in line with the results of the Chicago School on exclusive dealing.
26See also Segal and Whinston (2000).
20cost at the level c(e), and the downstream ￿rm can invests i to increase demand at the level
D(pD;P￿D;i), with c(0) ￿ c, ce < 0 and cee > 0 and with D(p;P;0) ￿ D(p;P), Di > 0 and
Dii < 0.
In case of vertical separation, the market equilibrium is characterized as above, with a
wholesale price w￿(c(e)). As noticed, all the surplus goes to the upstream ￿rm and nothing to
the downstream ￿rm. With such an expectation, the downstream ￿rm tends to underinvest
ex ante, which in turn reduces the investment of the upstream ￿rm as well. More precisely,
we have the following equilibrium investments:27




￿ = 1 (21)
This is the classic ￿hold up￿problem (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979) which limits the
bene￿ts of vertical separation. Both ￿rms could gain from committing to the higher ￿rst-best
investment (which maximizes their joint surplus), that is:
[pD ￿ c(e￿)]Di(pD;P￿D;i￿) = 1 and jce(e￿)D(pD;P￿D;i￿)j = 1 (22)
but the impossibility of writing (or enforcing) contracts on the division of the surplus leads
to ine¢ cient underinvestment.
In case of vertical integration, the integrated ￿rm L competes simultaneously with the
other integrated ￿rms, losing the commitment power associated with the franchising contract.
In equilibrium, ￿rm L chooses a price pL = p(e;i) that satis￿es the standard optimality
condition:
D(pL;P￿L;i) + D1 (pL;P￿L;i)[pL ￿ c(e)] = 0
and is decreasing in e and increasing in i. As usual, the endogenous market structure is
characterized by a price for the other ￿rms p and an endogenous value for the price aggregator
P that are both independent from p(e;i), with P￿L = P + g(p) ￿ g(pL) depending on the




D(pL;P + g(p) ￿ g(p(e;i));i)[pL ￿ c(e)] ￿ F ￿ e ￿ i
27Notice that de=di = ￿ceDi=ceeD > 0 under our assumptions. The suboptimality of both investments
follows from the fact that they are complements in the sense of Hart (1995): the cross derivative of total
surplus with respect to e and i is positive.


















￿ ￿ = 1 (24)
The two investments are used beyond their direct bene￿ts. Once again, the strategic purpose
is to commit to a low price against the rivals, which requires extra investment in e and less
investment in i. However, since these investments are costly, they do not allow the integrated
￿rm to replicate the best precommitment equilibrium. In conclusion, strategic reasons lead
the integrated ￿rm to distort investment to reduce the price.
At this point one can compare the relative merits of vertical separation and vertical
integration in markets whose structure is endogenous. Vertical separation allows one to
implement the optimal aggressive pricing strategy through the franchising contract, but leads
to suboptimal investments (especially for the downstream ￿rm) in relation-speci￿c activities.
Vertical integration allows one to fully internalize the investment strategies, but requires
costly distortions from the optimal investments to obtain a strategic advantage in the market.
Of course, the trade-o⁄between these bene￿ts and costs determines whether vertical contracts
are optimal. Nevertheless, even when these contracts remain optimal, this simple example
shows that hold up problems (and not only informational asymmetries) can create distortions
that limit the e⁄ectiveness of strategic contracts.
There are many other contractual arrangements that a⁄ect market competition. Some
of them, just as the vertical contracts examined in this section, are also relevant for the
antitrust analysis of dominant ￿rms. In the next section we focus on a well known example
of horizontal contracts, that is contracts a⁄ecting competition between ￿rms selling to the
same buyers.
7 Tying contracts
Tying involves a contractual agreement whereby a seller gives buyers access to a product only
if the buyers agree to purchase another product as well. In an in￿ uential article, Whinston
(1990) has shown that when a monopolist in a primary market is active also in a secondary
market characterized by a Bertrand duopoly, tying of the two goods can only be used for
entry deterrence purposes, because by itself it can only strengthen competition and reduce
pro￿ts in both markets. However, this result, which has been at the basis of the modern
22antitrust approach to tying,28 breaks down when the structure of the secondary market is
endogenous.29
To verify this, let us follow Whinston (1990) and consider two markets without any
complementarities on the supply or demand side. Imagine for simplicity that the primary
market is a monopolistic one characterized by zero costs of production and a constant demand
DM at the price v, which corresponds to the valuation of the primary good alone. The
secondary market is characterized by product di⁄erentiation and price competition as in our
usual set-up. In the absence of tying, the gross pro￿ts of the monopolist, which is active also
in the secondary market as ￿rm M, are the sum of the pro￿ts in both markets:
￿M = vDM + (pM ￿ c)D(pM;P￿M) ￿ F (25)
while pro￿ts for any other ￿rm i derive from the secondary market only:
￿i = (pi ￿ c)D(pi;P￿i) ￿ F
Under tying, the demand for the monopolistic good is constrained by the demand for the
other good, which is assumed to be lower than DM (to focus on the interesting case). The
bundle price pMB can be decomposed as pMB = v + pM where pM can be now interpreted
as an implicit price of the secondary good produced by the monopolist. In such a case, the
pro￿ts for the monopolist become:
￿MB = (pMB ￿ c)D(pMB ￿ v;P￿M) ￿ F = (pM + v ￿ c)D(pM;P￿M) ￿ F (26)
The other ￿rms have the same objective function as before.
First of all, let us summarize the results of Whinston (1990) for the case of a single
potential rival in the secondary market. A commitment to bundle strengthens competition
in the secondary market. Therefore, in case of entry of the single rival, it reduces the pro￿ts
of the monopolist in both markets. However, in case of entry deterrence, the monopolist
remains alone and can choose the monopolistic price of the bundle: even if this delivers lower
pro￿ts than the uncostrained monopolistic prices, under weak conditions it is a pro￿table
28For recent developments always in a duopolistic set up, see Nalebu⁄ (2004) and Peitz (2008).
29An earlier version of this idea (presented in Etro, 2007) based the optimality of tying on network e⁄ects
or cost sinergies. I am grateful to Jan Vandekerckhove, whose numerical simulations led me to realize the
importance of the size of the demand for the stand alone product (relative to the demand for the bundle) for
the general optimality of tying contracts.
23strategy and reduces consumer utility. This is a classic example of predatory strategy (aimed
at inducing exit and establishing a monopoly), forbidden in most antitrust regulations.
Let us move now to the general case of endogenous market structures, assuming that the
￿xed cost is low enough to allow entry of multiple rivals in the secondary market. Without
tying, endogenous entry exhausts all the pro￿table opportunities in the secondary market,
and the monopolist enjoys equilibrium pro￿ts from the primary market only:
￿M = vDM (27)
Consider tying now. In Bertrand equilibrium the monopolist chooses the bundle price pBM =
pM + v satisfying:
(pM + v ￿ c)D1 (pM;P￿M) + D(pM;P￿M) = 0 (28)
while each one of the other ￿rms chooses p satisfying the ￿rst order and free entry conditions:
(p ￿ c)D1 (p;P) + D(p;P) = 0 and (p ￿ c)D(p;P) = F (29)
so that the pro￿ts of the tying monopolist become ￿MB = (pM + v ￿ c)D(pM;P￿M) ￿ F.
As usual, p and P do not depend on v and on the tying strategy, while pM(v) has to be
decreasing in v.30 Therefore, the price of the bundle pBM = pM(v) + v increases less than
proportionally with v, and the monopolist o⁄ers the bundle with a discount on the secondary
good compared to its competitors. Clearly, tying is optimal if ￿MB > ￿M, that is, if:
[pM(v) ￿ c]D[pM(v);PM] ￿ F > v fDM ￿ D[pM(v);PM]g (30)
whose left hand side is the gain in pro￿ts in the competitive market and whose right hand
side is the loss in pro￿ts in the monopolistic market: as long as the demand in the primary
market, given by the exogenous parameter DM, is close enough to the demand for the bundled
good D[pM(v);PM], this inequality is automatically satis￿ed. For instance, consider the case











(￿ ￿ 1)(E ￿ F)
30In particular we have:
p0
M(v) =
￿D1 [pM;P + g(p) ￿ g(pM)]
￿
< 0
where ￿ ￿ 2D1 +(pM +v￿c)[D11 ￿g0(pM)D12]￿g0(pM)D2 < 0 by the stability of the equilibrium system.
24and the equilibrium price of the bundle satis￿es:
pM(v) < p and pM(v) >
(c ￿ v)￿E
(￿ ￿ 1)(E ￿ F)
The condition for the pro￿tability of tying can be solved for:
pM(v) >
(c ￿ v)￿E
(￿ ￿ 1)(E ￿ F ￿ vDM)
which is always satis￿ed for DM small enough.
Summing up our general insights, we have:
Proposition 5. When a monopolist in a primary market is active in a secondary market
under competition in prices with endogenous entry, the monopolist gains from tying its two
goods (without fully deterring entry) as long as the demand for the bundle is close enough to
the demand of the monopolistic product.
It should be clear that tying does not allow the monopolist to replicate the best equilibrium
(which would require monopolistic pricing in the primary market and price leadership in the
secondary one). The ine¢ ciency here is due to the fact that tying is a discrete strategy that
generates an advantage from the pre-commitment on the bundle price, but also a cost from
the rigidity of the price strategy in the two separate markets.31 However, it is an example
of a contractual restriction on consumers that can improve pro￿ts while reducing prices.
This is possible because of the ine¢ cient pricing emerging without tying, which allows the
monopolist to reduce the bundle price and still be able to gain market shares and pro￿ts.
Not surprisingly, the same outcome emerges under competition in quantities.
7.1 Antitrust implications
We have shown that when 1) the secondary market is characterized by di⁄erentiated goods
and an endogenous market structure with space for multiple ￿rms, and 2) the demand for
the bundled good is close enough to the demand of the primary product, tying is a pro￿table
device to reduce prices without fully deterring entry in the secondary market (which was
31Loosely speaking, one cannot choose the optimal degree of tying, but can only choose yes or no. For the
same reason (the discreteness of the choice) we cannot employ the general principle of strategic commitments
of Etro (2006). However, @￿MB=@pM ￿@￿M=@pM = vD1 < 0, therefore tying makes the monopolist tough.
This implies that the monopolist is led to reduce the e⁄ective price in the secondary market by choosing a
low price of the bundle.
25impossible in case of market power in the secondary market as in Whinston, 1990). It is
important to remark that, with endogenous entry tying does not have a predatory purpose
as assumed by the leverage theory of tied good sales, even if it tends to strengthen competition
and to reduce the number of competitors in the secondary market: in the case of a single rival,
tying made it possible to establish a monopoly in both markets able to increase the implicit
price of the secondary good, but endogenous entry makes this impossible and actually leads
to a reduction of the implicit price of the secondary good.
On the other side, our result rejects also the single-monopoly pro￿t theorem of the Chicago
school, for which a monopolist in one market cannot use tying to leverage market power in
another market where entry is free: as we have seen, a monopolist can do that, because tying
can create larger gains in the secondary market than losses in the primary one. Again, this
is possible because of the ine¢ cient pricing emerging in the free entry equilibrium.
As in the case of vertical restraints analyzed in the previous section, the endogenous
market structures approach can also be seen as a generalization of the Chicago and post-
Chicago approaches. When the ￿xed cost tends to zero, the price of the untied good tends
to the marginal cost in the secondary sector and there is no strategic role for tying: this case
reproduces perfect competition and the single-monopoly pro￿t theorem. When the ￿xed cost
is large enough, there is space for at most a single rival in the secondary market, and tying
can be used for predatory purposes: in this case the leverage theory of tied good sales holds.
For (more likely) intermediate levels of the ￿xed costs, our result supports the spirit of
the Chicago School through a game theoretic analysis similar in spirit to the post-Chicago
approach: tying tends to be welfare-improving because it can induce a reduction of prices
and an increase of pro￿ts. In the Appendix we analyze microfounded demand functions (as
in the isoelastic example above) and show that tying does not a⁄ect consumer surplus in the
secondary market. Since consumer surplus in the primary market is zero with and without
tying (because of perfect price discrimination), it follows that: under endogenous entry in
the secondary market, when tying is adopted, consumer surplus does not change but total
pro￿ts and welfare increase.
Elsewhere (Etro, 2007, 2009) we have applied this theoretical result to a famous antitrust
investigation, the European one on Microsoft, concerning the tying of the operating system
Windows with software applications (Windows MediaPlayer in the ￿rst case and Internet
Explorer in a second investigation). The endogeneity of entry in the markets for media
players and especially for browsers (think of the rapid expansion of Firefox or the entry
26of Chrome), the possibility of multi-homing (using multiple secondary products, especially
di⁄erent media players) and the lack of demand for the primary product (operating systems)
without the secondary ones, suggest that the conditions for the optimality of tying without
predatory purposes were satis￿ed: therefore the tying strategies adopted by Microsoft were
not anticompetitive. Further applications of the endogenous market structure approach in
the analysis of exclusionary abuses are discussed in Etro and Kokkoris (2010).
7.2 Vertical mergers
A similar idea could be applied to analyze vertical mergers - as far as we know, the literature
on vertical mergers (between a subset of ￿rms) is entirely con￿ned to the case of an exogenous
number of ￿rms in both the upstream and downstream sectors (Salinger, 1988; Ordover et
al., 1990; Gaudet and van Long, 1996; Hackner, 2003).32
Consider an upstream monopolist selling an input to a downstream sector characterized
by price competition, product di⁄erentiation and endogenous entry: a merger between the
upstream ￿rm and a downstream ￿rm would have the traditional e⁄ect of eliminating the
double marginalization for the merged ￿rms, but it would also have the additional e⁄ect
of inducing aggressive retail pricing so as to extract positive pro￿ts from the downstream
market. Such an application could be exploited to examine the impact of the merger on
the equilibrium prices of the input and of the ￿nal good, and it could be extended to take
into account other upstream ￿rms: while such an analysis is beyond our scope, further
investigations in this direction could be fruitful.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have characterized a number of optimal strategic contracts for ￿rms active
in markets with endogenous structures. Traditional results on sale incentives, managerial
schemes, screening contracts, franchising, exclusive dealing and tying contracts radically
change when ￿rms compete in prices but entry in the market is endogenous. A side e⁄ect
of our analysis is that the traditional ambiguity of a wide literature on strategic contracts
vanishes when these are evaluated in markets with endogenous structures: in such a case,
the nature of the optimal contracts does not depend on the mode of competition, but only
32I am grateful to a referee for pointing out this ￿eld of applications.
27on their impact on endogenous entry decisions.
We have been dealing with contracts between the ￿rm and its managers (incentive con-
tracts) and between the ￿rm and its customers (vertical contracts and tying), but other
applications concern other stakeholders.33 For instance, in Etro (2010) I have looked at con-
tracts between di⁄erent shareholders to characterize the optimal debt contracts for a ￿rm
competiting in a market with endogenous entry. Also in that case, traditional results change
and, under competition in prices with endogenous entry and cost uncertainty, the equity
holders of a ￿rm always gain from adopting debt contracts with the purpose of commit-
ting to aggressive strategies. Further theoretical research could investigate other contractual
arrangements under di⁄erent contractual problems (for instance renegotiation or corruption).
Finally, our results could be used to re-evaluate the empirical analysis on the relation
between competition and strategic contracts. We have emphasized the impact of the entry
threats on the nature of the optimal contracts: one should expect the emergence of sale
incentives, high-powered incentive mechanisms and bonuses for the managers of ￿rms facing
strong entry threats and less for ￿rms without such a threat. Further research could fruitfully
focus on the impact of entry pressure on contractual arrangements.
Appendix: Generalizations and welfare.
To generalize the implications of our approach, let us consider n di⁄erentiated goods produced
by di⁄erent ￿rms. The consumption of each good xi with i = 1;2;:::;n contributes to create the









where ￿(￿) and the subutilities u(￿) are increasing and concave functions. Maximization under a
standard budget constraint with income E, such that
Pn
j=1 xjpj = E delivers an inverse demand






decreasing in the quantity of each product, which implies
substitutability between goods. For instance, isoelastic preferences ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz generate an
inverse demand nested in the above function.
33Similar results emerge in the analysis of strategic policy for ￿rms active in foreign markets with endoge-
nous structures: under endogenous entry it is always optimal to implement policies that induce an aggressive
behavior of the domestic ￿rms abroad. See Etro (2009, 2011) for a review of strategic macroeconomic policies.
28From the utility maximization problem, one can also obtain the direct demand for ￿rm i as




, for some positive functions
f(￿) and g(p) with g0(p) < 0 such that
Pn
j=1 xj ￿ P = E: notice that the minimization of this
price index is by de￿nition equivalent to the maximization of welfare. Equivalently, demand can
be expressed as Di = D(pi;P￿i) with D1 < 0, D2 < 0, where the price aggregator P￿i =
Pn
j=1;j6=i g(pj) depends on all the other prices, as we did in the main text. Substitutability between
goods is guaranteed by the fact that the cross derivatives @Di=@pj ￿ ￿ij are always positive:




































, and welfare is decreasing in it.
Each ￿rm bears a ￿xed cost of entry F > 0 and produces at a variable cost C(￿) which is
increasing in output. Given this description of the technological conditions and our microfoundation
of the demand side, one can express the pro￿ts of each ￿rm in terms of the quantity strategies xj
or of price strategies pj, and investigate competition in quantities or in prices with (or without)
endogenous entry. However, in our baseline model, we allow a single ￿rm, say ￿rm L, to adopt
contractual arrangements with its partners (managers, retailers, customers, employers,..) that may
a⁄ect its own pro￿tability. For simplicity, let us summarize these agreements with a single parameter
k ￿ 0 where k = 0 is equivalent to no agreement. Most contracts a⁄ect cost e¢ ciency, as for the
incentive contracts for the managers, but other contracts may a⁄ect the relevant objective function
in di⁄erent ways (as for sale-based incentives, vertical separation or tying contracts). Therefore, we
will adopt a very general speci￿cation in which k can a⁄ect demand or costs in an unspeci￿ed way.
The timing of our main models is the following:
Stage 1: ￿rm L adopts a contractual arrangement k to maximize its expected pro￿ts.
Stage 2: entry of other ￿rms occurs until expected pro￿ts are non-negative.
Stage 3: all ￿rms j = 1;2;:::;L;:::;n choose simultaneously their market strategy.
Finally, let us assume that the ￿xed costs are low enough or product di⁄erentiation is deep
29enough that entry of other ￿rms is pro￿table in equilibrium. The subgame perfect equilibrium is
characterized by a contractual arrangement k, a number of entrants n, and the associated strategies
xj under quantity competition or pj under price competition. Given this, consumer surplus is
associated with the resulting utility U, and total welfare is de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus
and total pro￿ts. Given this model, we can prove the following general result:
34
neutrality theorem. Under endogenous entry, the consumer surplus and the strategies of
the entrants are independent from any strategic contract signed by a ￿rm.








5xi ￿ C(xi) ￿ F









5xL ￿ C(xL;k) ￿ F
At stage 3, all strategies must maximize pro￿ts, which delivers the following equilibrium conditions
for the entrants and ￿rm L:
p(x;￿) + p1 (x;￿)x = C0(x)
p(xL;￿;k) + p1 (xL;￿;k)xL = C0(xL;k)
where ￿ = (n ￿ 1)u(x) + u(xL). At stage 2, the number of ￿rms is determined by the zero pro￿t
condition:
p(x;￿)x ￿ C(x) = F
These conditions determine x and ￿ independently from k. Therefore, consumer surplus is U =
￿(￿), which is also independent from k. At stage 1, ￿rm L can optimally choose k without a⁄ecting
x, ￿ and U.
Consider price competition now. The assumed preferences generate a direct demand for each




= f [P￿i + g(pi)], whose
minimization is equivalent to the maximization of utility. Without loss of generality, we can re-
express demand for a ￿rm in terms of its price and of an aggregator of the other prices P￿i =
34Further investigations on this neutrality result have been independently developed by the interesting
work of Anderson et al. (2010).
30Pn
j=1;j6=i g(pj). Adopting the latter convention, the pro￿t of ￿rm j 6= L can be written as:
￿i = piD(pi;P￿i) ￿ C [D(pi;P￿i)] ￿ F
The pro￿t of ￿rm L is analogous, but can be a⁄ected by the contractual arrangements summarized
by k:
￿L = piD(pi;P￿i;k) ￿ C [D(pi;P￿i;k);k] ￿ F
At stage 3, all strategies must maximize pro￿ts, which delivers the following equilibrium conditions
for the entrants and ￿rm L:
D(p;P) + pD1 (p;P) = C0 [D(p;P)]D1 (p;P)
D(pL;P￿L;k) + pLD1 (pL;P￿L;k) = C0 [D(pL;P￿L;k);k]D1 (pL;P￿L;k)
where P = (n ￿ 2)g (p) + g(pL) and P￿L = (n ￿ 1)g (p). At stage 2, the number of ￿rms is
determined by the zero pro￿t condition:
pD(p;P) ￿ C [D(p;P)] = F
These conditions determine p and P independently from k. Therefore, also the price index ￿ P =
P + g(p) is independent from k, which implies that consumer surplus U is independent as well. At
stage 1, ￿rm L can optimally choose k without a⁄ecting p, P and ￿ P.
This theorem shows that, even if the contract chosen by ￿rm L can a⁄ect the pro￿tability and
the equilibrium strategy of the same ￿rm (which can a⁄ect entry of competitors as well), ultimately
it is neutral toward the strategies adopted by the other ￿rms and the utility of consumers. Pro￿t
maximization and endogenous entry determine the strategies of the entrants and, through this, the
relevant measure of welfare for the consumers. When the contract induces an aggressive strategy,
for instance a larger production or a lower price, this does not a⁄ect the strategies chosen by the
competitors but has to restrict entry (and vice versa for a contract inducing an accommodating
strategy). For instance, under competition in quantities the total production remains the same even
if the contractual arrangement changes the production of the ￿rm adopting it, and under competition
in prices a properly de￿ned price index remains unchanged even if there is a change in the price of
the ￿rm adopting the contractual arrangement. An immediate corollary of the above theorem is the
following:
Corollary. Whenever the contractual arrangement is optimally chosen in equilibrium, total
welfare must be (weakly) increased.
31The reason is that, whenever a contract is adopted by ￿rm L, it must (weakly) increase its
pro￿ts without a⁄ecting consumer surplus and leaving zero pro￿ts to all the entrants. This is what
happened in our models when the demand function was microfounded as above.
A related investigation by Etro (2006) on a more general (but not microfounded) class of games
with endogenous entry has provided a more precise characterization of the equilibria: there is always
a strategic incentive to adopt a preliminary commitment which increases the marginal pro￿tability of
a higher production, or decreases the marginal pro￿tability of a higher price - ￿13 (pL;P￿L;k) < 0
in the main text. As a consequence, under both quantity and price competition, it is optimal to adopt
contractual commitments ￿nalized to an aggressive pricing behavior in the market: sale incentives,
high-powered incentive contracts, screening contracts inducing extra e⁄ort, franchising contracts
with extra sales for the retailers and tying contracts. Moreover, as a consequence of our previous
results for microfounded demand functions, the unilateral adoption of the optimal contracts does
not a⁄ect consumer surplus and (weakly) increases total welfare.
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